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Abstract—The huge number of nodes that is expected to join
the Internet of Things in the short term will add major scalability
issues to several procedures. A recent promising approach to
these issues is based on social networking solutions to allow
objects to autonomously establish social relationships. Every
object in the resulting Social IoT (SIoT) exchanges data with
its friend objects in a distributed manner to avoid the need
for centralized solutions to implement major functionalities,
such as: node discovery, information search and trustworthiness
management. However, the number and types of established
friendship affects network navigability. This paper addresses this
issue proposing an efficient, distributed and dynamic strategy for
the objects to select the right friends for the benefit of the overall
network connectivity. The proposed friendship selection model
relies on a Shapley-value based algorithm mapping the friendship
selection process in the SIoT onto the coalition formation problem
in a corresponding cooperative game. The obtained results show
that the proposed solution is able to ensure global navigability,
measured in terms of average path length among two nodes in
the network, by means of a distributed and wise selection of the
number of friend objects a node has to handle.
Index Terms—IoT, Shapley-value, Social Network, Network
Navigability, Game Theory
I. Introduction
With the spreading of RFID-tagged objects and smart de-
vices such as phones, TVs, and wireless sensor networks, the
distance between physical and virtual worlds will be gradually
shortened, leading to the so-called Internet of Things (IoT)
paradigm. According to [1], by 2015 the RFID devices alone
will reach the number of hundreds of billions; in line with this
forecast, Cisco [2] foresees 6.58 connected smart devices per
person by 2020.
This large number of heterogeneous and pervasive objects
continuously generate data about their sensed surroundings
[3] and connect different realities, ranging from transport to
education and from business to home management. Many
applications can be built by exploiting information and ser-
vices provided by groups of objects with different kinds of
information about the physical world. However, this calls for
effective methodologies for a fast and dynamic discovery of
objects offering the desired service.
Indeed, as explained in [4], searching in the IoT represents
a crucial challenge: in addition to the size of the searching
space, sensors are often required to produce data in real-
time, which then corresponds to highly dynamics readings,
as it may happen when tracking the position of an object
or sensing humidity/temperature/presence in the surrounding
environment.
An approach that has the potentials to properly address
the mentioned scalability issues and that has been gaining
popularity in the last years is based on the use of social
networking technologies to allow objects to autonomously
establish social relationships. The driving motivation is that
a social-oriented approach is expected to put forward the
discovery, selection and composition of services and informa-
tion provided by distributed objects and networks that have
access to the physical world [5], [6] and [7]. In [8] the
Social IoT (SIoT) concept is formalized, which is intended
as a social network where every node is an object capable
of establishing social relationships with other things in an
autonomous way according to rules set by the owner. Then,
every object can look for the desired service by exploiting
the knowledge about its friendships to guarantee an efficient
and scalable search for services and objects in the same way
humans seek for information in social networks. Accordingly,
the resulting searching process is distributed, as each object
that needs to find the target peer looks among its friends,
which in turn inquire their friends if they cannot provide the
requested service.
The belief that objects would be able to navigate the SIoT
network with only local information is founded on the works
of the sociologist Stanley Milgram [9] and the computer
scientist Jon Kleinberg [10]. Milgram studied the small-world
phenomenon and demonstrated that people are tied by short
chains of acquaintances, while Kleinberg concluded that there
are structural clues in a social network that help people to
efficiently find a short path even without a global knowledge of
the network. Clearly, the resulting SIoT performance is strictly
subject to the capability of the objects to replicate the human
innate behavior when handling social relationship, e.g., select
the right friends, consult the appropriate service provider,
evaluate the trustworthiness of the peers and community. To
this aim, each object has to store and manage the information
related to its friends, data about past transactions, quality of
services for past interactions, services that can be provided
by friends, and so on. An important parameter that needs to
be considered is the number of relationships that an object
establishes, which affects its memory consumption, the waste
2of computational power and battery, and the effectiveness of
service discovery operations. Which object to promote as a
friend among the potential candidates is also a key aspect for
the overall system performance.
These issues have been recently addressed; however the
proposed strategies are quite simple and the performance
has only been analyzed in terms of global [11] and local
[12] network navigability. These considerations motivate the
present paper, which aims at defining an efficient strategy for
the objects to select the right friends for the benefit of the
overall network navigability. An important feature that has to
be guaranteed is that the resulting friend selection policy has to
be distributed and dynamic so that no central controllers have
to set a-priori static rules to establish social ties. Additionally,
the navigability of the resulting network structure should be
independent on the implemented routing algorithm and the
application triggering the search operations. In this view, the
major contributions of the paper are the following:
• We define a model for friendship selection that rely on
a Shapley-value based algorithm. The utility function
carefully models the corresponding game to meet the
posed constraints.
• We evaluate the performance of network navigability in
terms of average number of hops by using local peer
search operations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II the proposed game theoretic solution for the problem
is described, whereas Section III reports on the details of
the proposed friendship selection algorithm. The performance
evaluation results are summarized in section IV, and conclu-
sive remarks are given in the last section.
II. Proposed Approach for Friendship Selection in the SIoT
How to select an effective set of friendship relationships
among the possible candidates has been addressed in the past
in the context of information diffusion in social networking
problems. Usually, a score is assigned to each member of
the set of potential devices [13], where the selected score
somehow corresponds to the importance of that device for the
application at hand. However, such a conventional approach
suffers from the main intrinsic limitation that it only considers
the relative importance of objects as stand-alone entities.
Contrarily, the key requirement is to understand the importance
of each object in terms of its contribution to a certain utility
when combined with other nodes [14]. The flexibility, which
comes from the ability to take into account the contributions of
all possible combinations of objects (rather than considering
just one node at a time), is absent in conventional centrality
measures. This is a crucial limitation in many applications and
represents the reason why game theoretic network centrality
measures have been proposed in research activities relevant to
social networks of humans.
Solutions to the raised problem can be effectively found by
using one of the most used concepts in value or cost-sharing
game theoretic applications, namely the Shapley-value [15].
Thanks to its intrinsic capability to capture the contribution
of the single players to different coalitions of players, the
Shapley-value has found several applications both in network-
ing and social analysis. For instance in [16] it is adopted for
a monetary cost analysis for a fair content sharing for both
network/service providers and the end-users. In the domain of
social networks and networks in general, the Shapley-value is
adopted as a measure of the relative importance of single nodes
[17]. Closer to the contribution of this paper, the Shapley-value
has been applied to social networking problems in [18], [13]
and [19]. In particular, in [18] a set of new centrality measures
are proposed based on cooperative game theoretic notions.
An analysis of the Shapley-value for network centrality has
been presented also in [13], with results demonstrating the
opportunities for efficiency gains. In [19] the focus is on
the information diffusion problem in social networks with
particular focus on the target set selection issue.
These promising results obtained for the information dif-
fusion problem in social networking of humans suggest that
the Shapley-value has interesting features that can also be
exploited for the friendship selection problem in the Social
Internet of Things addressed by our paper. We then propose
a Shapley-value based game theoretic modeling for friendship
selection in the SIoT. In particular, we map the friendship
selection process in the SIoT onto the coalition formation
problem in a corresponding cooperative game. The Shapley-
values of the nodes in the game represents the importance
of an object in the social IoT network and will be used to
set the friendship preferences. The adopted utility function
plays a key role for the problem and will be carefully modeled
for the corresponding game to meet the posed constraints. In
the following section we will provide an overview of Social
Internet of Things concepts.
A. Social Internet of Things
In this paper, without losing of generality, we refer to
the social IoT model proposed in [8] (we use the acronym
SIoT to refer to it). According to this model, a set of forms
of socialization among objects are foreseen. The parental
object relationship is defined among similar objects, built
in the same period by the same manufacturer (the role of
family is played by the production batch). Moreover, ob-
jects can establish co-location object relationship and co-
work object relationship, like humans do when they share
personal (e.g., cohabitation) or public (e.g., work) experiences.
A further type of relationship is defined for objects owned by
the same user (mobile phones, game consoles, etc.) that is
named ownership object relationship. The last relationship is
established when objects come into contact, sporadically or
continuously, for reasons purely related to relations among
their owners (e.g., devices/sensors belonging to friends); it
is named social object relationship. These relationships are
created and updated on the basis of the objects features (such
as: object type, computational power, mobility capabilities,
brand) and activity (frequency in meeting the other objects,
mainly). The management of the relationships is implemented
in the cloud, in the object gateways, and in objects themselves
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configuration of these functionalities is controlled by the object
owner; accordingly, the resulting links are asymmetrical.
Before going into the details of the proposed approach, in
the next section we will first recall some basic notions of game
theory used in this paper. For more information on the subject,
the reader is referred to the vast literature available, such as
for example [20].
B. Game-Theoretic Notions for Network Navigability
The process of assigning a value to each node/object in
a network can be naturally modeled as a coalitional game
G =< N , v(·) > with transferable utilities (TU), where N is
the set of N players and v(·) is a value function [21]. A value
function v(S) is a mapping from nonempty coalition S to a
real number. Thus, given a subset S of N , we call v(S) the
value of the coalition S, which is the maximum aggregated
payoff available for division among players who are members
of S when working together without the help of players in
N\S. The set of players N is called the grand coalition and
v(N) is called the value of the grand coalition.
We can define x ∈ <|N| (| · | represents the cardinality of a
set) as a vector one-to-one associated with players in N , so
that xi denotes the component associated with player i ∈ N .
For any vector x ∈ <|N|, we denote by x(S) the value ∑i∈S xi,
where S ⊆ N is a coalition. A feasible payoff profile (or pre-
imputation) of G is a vector x ∈ <|N| such that x(N) = v(N).
An imputation of G is a feasible value profile x ∈ <|N | such
that xi ≥ v({i}), for each i ∈ N . This condition is usually
called individual rationality. The set of all imputations of
the game G is denoted by X(G). An outcome for G is an
imputation from X(G) that specifies the distribution of the
value to any player of the game. A typical requirement of a
good outcome is to be “stable” with respect to the possibility
that subsets of players find convenient to deviate from it and
form alternative coalitions to attain higher values. The set of
such stable outcomes is known as the core of the game.
There are many solution concepts proposed in Game Theory
literature, but only those associated with unique profiles are
usually desirable in practical applications. Among these, the
Shapley-value [15] is one of the most used. In particular,
it describes an effective approach to the fair allocation of
gains obtained from the cooperation among players of a
cooperative game. Since some players may contribute more
to the total value than others, an important requirement is to
fairly distribute gains among the players. To this purpose, in
deciding the payoff to be allocated to the players, the Shapley-
value accounts for the relative importance of each player to
the game.
Definition 1 (Shapley-value [15]). The Shapley-value of a TU
game G = 〈N , v(·)〉 is the pre-imputation of G assigning to
every player i ∈ N the following value
φi(G) =
1
|N|!
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N| − |S| − 1)![v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)].
In words, the Shapley-value assigns a value to each player
i by taking into account his average marginal contribution,
where the average is computed over all different sequences
according to which the grand coalition could be built up from
the empty coalition. In general, the Shapley-value may fall
outside the core, even if the core is not empty. Thus, in
particular, the Shapley-value is not necessarily an imputation,
and it may violate the individual rationality condition.
This solution concept has also a nice axiomatic characteri-
zation supporting its notion of fairness (it is the unique pre-
imputation that satisfies the Symmetry, Dummy Player, and
Additivity axioms). A natural way to interpret the Shapley-
value φi(G) of player i is in terms of the average marginal
contribution that player i makes to any sub-coalition of N
assuming all orderings are equally likely. The Shapley-value
takes into account all possible coalitional dynamics and ne-
gotiation scenarios among the players and comes up with a
single unique way of distributing the value v(N) of the grand
coalition among all the players. Thus, the Shapley-value of a
player accurately reflects the bargaining power of the player
and the marginal value the player brings to the game.
An additional simplifying assumption, usually made when
modeling a TU coalitional game, is that the game is superad-
ditive. A game is superadditive if the characteristic function
of the game is such that for any S and T disjoint coalitions
(S∩T = ∅) subsets of N , we have that v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+v(T ).
In words, a coalition formed by the merger of two or more
coalitions will realize a value at least as great as the sum of
the values of the coalitions merged. This seems a reasonable
assumption for coalitional games and the proposed Shapley-
value is usually applied in superadditive games. However, the
Shapley-value can also be computed for games with a non
superadditivite characteristic function [22]. In these cases the
Shapley-value will lack the property of individual rationality,
thus, some players may have values less than the value they
can generate as a singleton coalition. Noteworthy, in this paper
the game model does not foresee a value to be shared among
players, but it is used to find the most influential objects
among a set of candidate friend objects. Therefore, also non
superadditive characteristic functions are acceptable for our
scope.
III. Friendship selection algorithm
For simplicity in the analysis, we assume that the objects in
the SIoT have a commonly shared criterion to decide whether
to consider another object as a candidate object for a friendship
relation; this criterion is symmetric. For instance, if an object
i meets the given criterion with another object j, then also
node j meets the criterion w.r.t. node i. Moreover, we assume
that each object can establish up to a maximum number of
friendships Nmax, as each object has limited resources. When
the criterion is met between a couple of objects not friends
yet, then a new friendship is directly established if the list
of friends for the two nodes has less than Nmax objects. If
this is not the case, then a friendship selection algorithm is
4triggered to choose the most influential Nmax friends among
the candidate objects.
The proposed friendship selection algorithm aims at select-
ing the objects that offer the maximum marginal contribution
to the global services in the SIoT. To compute the marginal
contributions of the candidate objects, a cooperative coalitional
game, as described in the previous section, is modeled. The
set of candidate objects are the players in the cooperative
game and the Shapley-value is used to compute the marginal
contributions of the individual players to the overall value
achieved by the grand coalition in the game. First, based
on the Shapley-value, a ranking list of the candidate objects
is computed, and then the top Nmax objects are selected,
with the only constraint that a node cannot refuse or discard
relationships if this action is going to isolate a node. If nodes
i and j are mutually in the top Nmax objects of the respectively
computed ranking lists, the friendship is established. In some
cases the establishment of a new friendship may require an
old one to be removed. When this happens, the choice of the
friendship to be removed is again driven by the Shapley-value
based ranking list.
A key aspect for the success of the proposed algorithm
is the wise definition of the utility function, which measures
the contribution of the candidate objects. By focusing on an
object i, which has to determine its Nmax friendships, we
will next define an utility function that best meets the system
requirements.
A. Average local clustering based model
The utility function we consider for the model is based on
the average local clustering coefficient [23]. This is defined
as: C = 1n
n∑
j=1
Clocal j where n is the number of players in a
coalition and Clocal j is the local clustering coefficient defined
as: Clocal j =
2·e j
k j·(k j−1) , where k j is the number of neighbors for
node j and e j is the number of edges among them. The driving
motivation comes from Kleinberg’s findings [10], namely that
network navigability is assured by the ability to reach nodes
with low values of local clustering since they are hardly
reachable through other paths. This gives us the possibility
of performing local choices that will guarantee that the global
navigability of the network is kept at acceptable levels.
The Transferable utility (TU)-game G = 〈N , v(·)〉 is mod-
eled on the set of Nmax +1 candidate friends for node i plus the
node i itself, thus we have that |N| = Nmax + 2. This number
derives from the consideration that the selection algorithm is
triggered only when a new object meets a given criterion
to become a friend of object i and this additional object
would make the number of friends go beyond the threshold
Nmax. Moreover, also node i must be considered, as the utility
function is directly influenced by the presence of node i in
any of the coalitions of objects. In details, we define the value
function as:
v(S) =
1 − 1|S|∑
i∈S
Clocali
 ∀S ⊆ N , and v(∅) = 0 (1)
Fig. 1. Friendship selection based on local clustering sample scenario.
Noteworthy, this utility function is non superadditive as in
some topology configurations some nodes, which join a pre-
existing set of friends, may actually adversely affect the local
clustering coefficient value.
We then sort the players in decreasing order of their
Shapley-value. From the so-constructed rank list, the candidate
objects are selected one at the time by scrolling the list in a
top-down order (clearly, node i itself will not be considered as
a candidate friend). If the friendship with an object is already
active, then nothing happens and the subsequent node in the
list is selected until Nmax nodes are selected from the list. If
the selected object has not been considered as a friend yet,
then the node tries to form a new friendship relationship. If
the new friendship request is accepted, then an old friendship
must be closed to meet the constraint on the Nmax number of
friendships of node i. Also for this choice the Shapley-based
rank list is used, and the less influential node is selected for
removal.
To better understand the behavior of the proposed solution,
let us consider the sample study case shown in Fig. 1. In
particular, objects 1 and 4 meet the criterion for a new potential
friendship (see dashed line in the Figure) and the proposed
algorithm is triggered to possibly update the friendships for
the involved objects. As an example, let us focus the attention
on object 1 and the computation of its list of preferences for
the friendships (a similar analysis can be repeated for object 4)
in the case where the maximum number of friends per object
1 is set to Nmax = 2. This means that the two objects with the
highest Shapley-value shall be selected as its friends. In the
scenario of the figure we can model the game as follows: N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}; v(1) = v(4) = v(14) = 0.667; v(2) = 0.9; v(3) =
0; v(12) = v(24) = 1 − 1/2 · (0.333 + 0.1) = 0.783; v(13) =
v(34) = 1 − 1/2 · (0.333 + 1) = 0.333; v(23) = 1 − 1/2 · (0.1 +
1) = 0.45; v(123) = v(234) = 1 − 1/3 · (0.333 + 0.1 + 1) =
0.522; v(124) = 1−1/3·(0.333+0.1+0.333) = 0.744; v(134) =
1 − 1/3 · (0.333 + 1 + 0.333) = 0.444; v(1234) = 1 − 1/4 ·
(0.333 + 0.1 + 1 + 0.333) = 0.558. By computing the marginal
contributions of the players based on the Shapley-value we
obtain the results in Table I. We observe that the order of
preferred friendships for object 1 are respectively, object 2,
5object 4 and object 3. Since Nmax = 2, object 1 will try to form
a friendship with objects 2 and 4 first, and consider object 3
only if any of the preferred friendships is not accepted by the
inquired objected.
TABLE I
Shapley-value for sample scenario in Fig. 1.
Case Object 1 Object 2 Object 3 Object 4
1234 v(1)-v(∅)=0.667 v(12)-v(1)=0.116 v(123)-v(12)=-0.261 v(N)-v(123)=0.036
1243 v(1)-v(∅)=0.667 v(12)-v(1)=0.116 v(N)-v(124)=-0.186 v(124)-v(12)=-0.039
1324 v(1)-v(∅)=0.667 v(123)-v(13)=0.189 v(13)-v(1)=-0.333 v(N)-v(123)=0.036
1342 v(1)-v(∅)=0.667 v(N)-v(134)=0.114 v(13)-v(1)=-0.333 v(134)-v(13)=0.111
1423 v(1)-v(∅)=0.667 v(124)-v(14)=0.077 v(N)-v(124)=-0.186 v(14)-v(1)=0
1432 v(1)-v(∅)=0.667 v(N)-v(134)=0.114 v(134)-v(14)=-0.222 v(14)-v(1)=0
2134 v(12)-v(2)=-0.117 v(2)-v(∅)=0.9 v(123)-v(12)=-0.261 v(N)-v(123)=0.036
2143 v(12)-v(2)=-0.117 v(2)-v(∅)=0.9 v(N)-v(124)=-0.186 v(124)-v(12)=-0.039
2314 v(123)-v(23)=0.072 v(2)-v(∅)=0.9 v(23)-v(2)=-0.45 v(N)-v(123)=0.036
2341 v(N)-v(234)=0.036 v(2)-v(∅)=0.9 v(23)-v(2)=-0.45 v(234)-v(23)=0.072
2413 v(124)-v(24)=-0.039 v(2)-v(∅)=0.9 v(N)-v(124)=-0.186 v(24)-v(2)=-0.117
2431 v(N)-v(234)=0.036 v(2)-v(∅)=0.9 v(234)-v(24)=-0.261 v(24)-v(2)=-0.117
3124 v(13)-v(3)=0.333 v(123)-v(13)=0.189 v(3)-v(∅)=0 v(N)-v(123)=0.036
3142 v(13)-v(3)=0.333 v(N)-v(134)=0.114 v(3)-v(∅)=0 v(134)-v(13)=0.111
3214 v(123)-v(23)=0.072 v(23)-v(3)=0.45 v(3)-v(∅)=0 v(N)-v(123)=0.036
3241 v(N)-v(234)=0.036 v(23)-v(3)=0.45 v(3)-v(∅)=0 v(234)-v(23)=0.072
3412 v(134)-v(34)=0.111 v(N)-v(134)=0.114 v(3)-v(∅)=0 v(34)-v(3)=0.333
3421 v(N)-v(234)=0.036 v(234)-v(34)=0.189 v(3)-v(∅)=0 v(34)-v(3)=0.333
4123 v(14)-v(4)=0 v(124)-v(14)=0.077 v(N)-v(124)=-0.186 v(4)-v(∅)=0.667
4132 v(14)-v(4)=0 v(N)-v(134)=0.114 v(134)-v(14)=-0.222 v(4)-v(∅)=0.667
4213 v(124)-v(24)=-0.039 v(24)-v(4)=0.117 v(N)-v(124)=-0.186 v(4)-v(∅)=0.667
4231 v(N)-v(234)=0.036 v(24)-v(4)=0.117 v(234)-v(24)=-0.261 v(4)-v(∅)=0.667
4312 v(134)-v(34)=0.111 v(N)-v(134)=0.114 v(34)-v(4)=-0.333 v(4)-v(∅)=0.667
4321 v(N)-v(234)=0.036 v(234)-v(34)=0.189 v(34)-v(4)=-0.333 v(4)-v(∅)=0.667
φi 0.2058 0.348 -0.202 0.2058
IV. Performance Evaluation
A numerical evaluation has been conducted by using the
Matlab® tool for a wide set of scenarios, to observe the achiev-
able performance in terms of navigability of the Social IoT. In
doing so, information about new relationship requests received
by the objects (based on their profile, settings, and movements)
is needed for huge numbers of real objects. Unfortunately, this
data is not available to date, as real applications involving a
high number of Social Things have not been deployed yet. We
thus rely on the Baraba´si-Albert model [24], which is able to
generate scale-free networks based on preferential attachment
with the same characteristics of real social networks.
The maximum number of friendship relationships Nmax can
(i) either be fixed a-priori, (ii) or vary during the network
lifetime. The second option helps to keep under control the
number of hubs in the network, which influences the network
navigability. In particular, for this case the value for Nmax is
increased when
there are x% of the N nodes in the network with at
least y% of Nmax friends,
where x represents the maximum percentage of hubs in
the network, whereas y represents the threshold for a node to
become a hub. We study the behavior of the networks obtained
with the Baraba´si-Albert model, with or without applying the
proposed Shapley-based strategies. The attention will be on
understanding when a node can be considered as a hub and
how many hubs are necessary in a network to improve network
navigability in terms of the average path length. To this aim,
we consider a simple local routing approach. In particular,
we refer to a scenario where a given object A wishes to
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Fig. 2. Average path length for different values of the maximum percentage
of hubs in the network.
communicate with node B. The first task to perform is to check
whether it has a direct connection with object B, that is, B is
among its friends. If not, A asks to the friend object with the
highest connectivity degree, let say X, to find a route to reach
B. Then, object X repeats the same procedure until object B
is finally reached.
In Fig. 2 the average path length is reported, for different
values in the range [0.1 − 0.4]% of the maximum percentage
of hubs x in the network and considering either y = 80% or
y = 90%. The novel proposed solutions are also compared with
the case where no strategy is applied (labeled as “no limit” in
the plots). As we can observe, a reduction in the number of
hubs in the network allows for an increase in the performance
of the network, as suggested by Kleinberg. This effect can
also be obtained when decreasing the threshold for a node
to become a hub, i.e., the y-value. However, if we relax too
much the control parameters, we fall again in the scenario “no
limit”. In fact, if x is set to 1N % then for every node reaching
a number of friends equal to y% of Nmax, the value of Nmax
increases. On the other hand, if we set y = 0%, every node is
considered as an hub and Nmax increases no matter what the
value for x is.
The other important result investigated is the maximum
number of friends reached by a node. This has been tested
for several combination of x and y, as plotted in Fig. 3. We
can observe how the proposed algorithm is able to drastically
decrease the number of friends that a node has to manage.
This is a interesting results, as this has a positive effect on
the computational burden for the objects. By comparing Fig.
2 and Fig. 3, an important observation is that if the number
of hubs in the network is low then each hub has to manage
more friends. This last feature means that by using more
stringent values of the parameters x and y, it is possible to
achieve better performance in terms of local navigability, but
this goes at the cost of an increase in the memory consumption,
computational power and battery life. To limit this problem, an
enhancement for the solution could be to adjust the maximum
number of friendships Nmax based on the node features and
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then allow only nodes with high computation capabilities, such
as vehicles or smart devices, to become hubs.
A further extension for the implementation of the proposed
solution that will be considered in our future research, is
to consider enhancing aspects referring to the average path
length:
• in our simulations we have considered all the possible
pairs of nodes to be uniformly distributed over the net-
work; however, it has been proved that friends share
similar interests (bringing to the homophily phenomenon
[25]), so that it is highly probable to find another node
in the friends list or in the friend of a friend (FOAF) list,
thus reducing the average path length among all the pairs
of nodes;
• node similarity for the routing operations has not been
considered so far; indeed, in our simulations nodes try
to reach their destination by using only information
about the degree of their neighbors. However, external
properties could be used to select the right nodes (among
available friends) to which ask for the desired service.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we defined the problem of friendship selection
in the SIoT, highlighting that if a Social Network of Things
is properly created it can show the characteristics of a small
world network and comply with the condition for network
navigability. Based on this knowledge, we proposed a model
for a distributed friendship selection that relies on the Shapley-
value. To this aim, the friendship selection process in the
SIoT is mapped onto the coalition formation problem for
a corresponding cooperative game. Based on a proposed
utility function, that meets the constraints for the system,
the Shapley-value nicely models the importance of an object
in the social IoT network and is used to set the friendship
preferences. The resulting network navigability in terms of
average number of hops by using local peer search operations
is evaluated and compared with a standard solution where no
limit on the friendships is set for the objects.
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